Really simple stuff
Two very knowledgeable correspondents of Melanie Phillips provide a damning indictment of the current state of the Metropolitan Police with respect to the Menezes case. Here's the first:
When the case first came up, I noted that there was only one operator in the surveillance van outside the premises where de Menezes was living. It is bad practice to have only one, but if it was necessary (manpower?) why did the operator leave the van to relieve himself? Firstly, it is completely unprofessional and, secondly, why did he not have a bottle - it was always good enough for me. His dereliction meant that an ID on de Menezes was not made as he left the house, something which might have avoided the whole mess.
When the surveillance teams were covering four (or was it five) targets, to have only one armed team in support seems very silly. How does one get a team across London, as it is pretty awful at the best of times. One shooting team should support one surveillance operation, unless they can move between them in minutes.
That the teams still did not have a communications capacity to work from over to under ground is shameful. As far as I know, the technology is available.
Not enough has been made of the chaos in the ops room. I have run ops rooms, and there has never been chaos. They must be as quiet as possible and if anyone made too much noise in mine, irrespective of rank or grade, they were told to be quiet. Orders were never given, then countermanded. That would cause complete confusion to the folk on the ground. Yes, sometimes circumstances changed and a redeployment was necessary, but only after consideration, however brief; then the redeployment would be given, clearly, over the net.
Cressida Dick, if she was in overall control of the ops room, should have, as far as possible, let her own officers run the job: one would assume that they were of at least Chief Inspector grade, and perfectly capable of running things. She should have been there simply for command decisions, not getting involved with minutiae.
That the firearms officer used seven expanding rounds at point blank range smacks of panic, and one wonders whether he has the right temperament for that job.
With such a major operation on, yes, Blair could have gone home, but he should have been on the end of a telephone or radio. He should have ordered that he was to be kept up to speed as soon as the operation started to move. I'm not suggesting that he would have known what to do, but at least he would have been informed, but perhaps he thought he was too important to be bothered. However, this was not a standard surveillance operation and with the possibility of firearms being used, I would have wanted to know precisely what was going on, although not get involved at the purely operational level; I wonder if his subordinates thought he might try.
And the second:
The most disturbing aspect of the whole affair is the almost complete refusal to accept the procedural and command errors in this operation, by both Sir Ian Blair, Cressida Dick and MetPol in general. Sir Ian's use of the word ‘alleged’ outside court indicates his blind spot or unwillingness to accept the court's decision.
Sir Ian should know that every operation of this type should have a ‘risk assessment’. These risk assessments can be of various types; for regular activities they should be formalised & laid down in writing. (For Special Branch, waiting for possibly armed terrorists, to leave a building might be thought of as one such!)
These assessments should identify risk and come up with a ‘method statement’ to minimise risk. This risk assessment is even more important where firearms are involved. There was time, on the morning, to do a risk assessment but even if there was not time for a written note, a dynamic risk assessment should have been carried out by the Operational Commander. It is an absolute requirement of such work, to protect both the public and the officers. Worryingly, Sir Ian does not seem to understand the need.
If the objective was to identify departing suspects and neutralise them by interception and identification, without alarming others in the premises, there were several clear dangers inherent to this proposal which were readily identifiable in advance with only a moments thought.
KEY among them:
1.That an innocent member of the public would be wrongly identified and violent stop action taken. (What occurred!)
2. That a suspect would leave the premises and spot the surveillance, possibly warning others and increasing risk.
3. That an armed suspect would make it to a crowded public area or public transport, again, increasing risk.
4. That if command & control always stayed with the operations room (the hapless M/s Dick), there might well be a breakdown in radio communications which would impede the overall objectives and cause a decision making gap, leading to 3 above or worse, and increasing risk.
The dynamic assessment would/should, automatically, have identified simple measures to mitigate these risks. This is REALLY SIMPLE STUFF and is, or should be for MetPol, standard procedure.
Firstly and most importantly in any such operation it is simply not practicable or sensible to rely for split second decision making on communications links. There MUST be an officer ON THE GROUND, AT THE SCENE, who can if necessary, take decisions without reference to the control room. That officer should be operating against a plan and against dynamic risk assessment guidelines, agreed with control. There was time for that to be done. That Ground Commander, operating within guidelines and agreed objectives, is VITAL in ANY such operation. There was no such individual.
Secondly, to mitigate the risks of 1, 2 & 3, policy should have been to detain and identify any suspect once out of sight of the premises and before they got anywhere near crowded public areas or public transport. This is truly simple, standard stuff. For Cressida Dick to imply now she would do nothing differently is a disgrace. For Sir Ian to imply, and robustly, that he has no culpability in this sloppy operational culture is ridiculous.
Is it M/S Dick's fault? I would say not entirely although she certainly -- notwithstanding the judge's remarks, bears high responsibility. It is surely an institutional cultural failing. Why? Because the police command system is historically very bad indeed at delegating authority.
Both of these statements indicate with remarkable thoroughness that the errors were systematic, organisational and elementary. If the culture of the organisation is at fault then only the head of the organisation can be responsible for this.
Unfortunately the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police seems determined to carry on regardless, notwithstanding the fact that the democratically elected London Assembly has passed a motion of "no confidence" in him by a substantial majority. The criticism from the government and from London Mayor Ken Livingstone that the calls for Sir Ian Blair's resignation are motivated by party politics is hypocritical: Sir Ian Blair is, and has always been, New Labour's favourite policeman. The questions that need to be answered are whether or not Sir Ian Blair accepts responsibility for the failings of his force; and whether he is the leader the Met needs to put its house back in order. Since Sir Ian has shown no indication that he accepts the first proposition, the answer to the second is clear enough. For the sake of the integrity of public service, Sir Ian Blair should be sacked.
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